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LEGISLATIVELY DIRECTED JUDICIAL ACTIVISM:
SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE MEANING OF
THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT
Matthew R. Kipp*
Paul B. Lewis**
With the Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA), Congress attempted to
further a trend that the federal judiciary had undertaken largely
on its own initiative. Sensing a critical need to address the mounting expense and delay of federal civil litigation, Congress, like the
judiciary, sought to increase the degree of early and active involvement of judges in the adjudicatory process. The result of this
mandate has been a further emphasis on the role of the judge as
a case manager. As a necessary corollary, the liberty and selfdetermination of individual litigants-ideals that have historically
been seen as philosophical cornerstones of the Anglo-American
adjudicative process-have been correspondingly diminished. In
this Article, the authors examine the departure from the philosophical moorings of the Anglo-American system of justice that
implementation of the CJRA represents and consider whether the
gains to be achieved by the Act, if successful, offset the potential
costs to the litigants that the Act imposes.

Ajudge is more than a moderator; he is cha.rged to see that
the law is properly administered, and it is a duty which he
cannot discharge by remaining inert. 1
You can't be a rationalist in an irrational world. It isn't
rational. 2
INTRODUCTION

The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA or Act)3 arose
from a reform movement that had been building for several

*
B.A. 1985, Yale University; J.D. 1989, Columbia University. Associate,
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom. Mr. Kipp was a member of the Civil Justice
Reform Act Advisory Group for the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
** B.A 1986, Northwestern University; J.D. 1989, Yale University.
1.
United States v. Marzano, 149 F.2d 923, 925 (2d Cir. 1945) (L. Hand, J.).
2.
JOE ORTON, WHAT THE BUTLER SAW 72, act 2 (Grove Press 1970) (1969).
3.
The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 is Title I of the Judicial Improvements
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482
(Supp. V 1993)).
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years. Long before Senator Joseph Biden introduced a bill to
reform the nation's civil justice system,4 judges and commentators alike had noted the sharp increase in cases filed in the
federal courts, the growing backlog of unresolved cases caused
by this increase, and the corresponding escalation in cost and
delay attendant with litigating a case in the federal system. 5
As a result of such trends, judges of their own accord increasingly had become involved in the management of pretrial
litigation. 6
The Civil Justice Reform Act was a legislative attempt to
coordinate and encourage various judicial methods to streamline federal litigation. The Act was based on the proposition
that the cost and delay of federal civil litigation had grown to
the level where access to, and use of, the nation's courts was
jeopardized for all but the wealthiest members of our society. 7
The central purpose of the Act was to assure continuing,
meaningful access to the federal courts by reducing both the
time and cost associated with litigating a case at the federal

4.
See infra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
5.
See, e.g., Anthony v. Abbott Lab., 106 F.R.D. 461, 465 (D.R.I. 1985) ("Our
citizens' access to justice ... is under serious siege. Obtaining justice in this modern
era costs too much .... °tlf our courts] are to remain strong and viable, they cannot
sit idly by in the face of attempts to loot the system."); Francis E. McGovern, Toward
a Functional Approach for Managing Complex Litigation, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 440, 443
(1986) ("Despite some evidence which shows that a dramatic reduction in case duration may offset increases in the filing rate, there is a general perception of judicial
system overload.").
6.
See, e.g., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE US., Civn. JUS'TICE REFoRM ACT REl'oRT 4·
(1994) [hereinafter CJRA REPORT] ("Prior to the CJRA many courts had established,
either by local rule or general order, various principles and techniques contained in
the statute."); Robert F. Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New
Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CAL. L. REV. 770 (1981) (discussing the use of pretrial management procedures for effective handling of the increasing
number of cases, especially complex and protracted cases); Charles R. Richey, Rule
16: A Survey and Some Considerations for the Bench and Bar, 126 F.R.D. 599, 600
(1989) (discussing a variety ofjudicial case management techniques); Alvin B. Rubin,
The Managed Calendar: Some Pragmatic Suggestions About Achieving the Just,
Speedy, and Inexpensive Determination of Civil Cases in Federal Courts, 4 JUST. SYS.
J. 135, 138-45 (1978) (listing seven advantages of judicial responsibility for case
control and discussing pragmatic ways to implement such procedures).
7.
See S. REP. No. 416, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6809 ("For the middle class of this country ... the courthouse
door is rapidly being slammed shut. Access to the courts, once available to everyone,
has become for middle-class Americans a luxury that only others can afford.")
(citation omitted).

WINTER 1995]

The Civil Justice Reform Act

307

level. 8 The Act proposed to do so largely through "improve[d)
litigation management" by the judge assigned to the case. 9
This mandate was far froni nominal. Although many judges
prior to the Act already had employed a variety of "managerial" techniques, this legislative directive represented a formal
recognition that the more traditional, passive role of the
judge-a role that was a primary value in the Anglo-American
system of justice-was no longer viable under present-day
conditions. Shortly after the Act's passage, Chief Justice
Rehnquist acknowledged this transformation of the role of the
federal judge:
This traditional view of district judges has changed somewhat in recent years. Huge case loads have led to more
emphasis on case management andjudicial administration,
and the recent Civil Justice Reform Act will accelerate this
trend. District judges have lost some of their discretion to
handle their own dockets and now must both view themselves as managers and experience some of the strong
hand of management themselves. 10
The CJRA is therefore significant for the philosophical
transformation that it signifies. Passage of the Act illustrates
the insight of Joe Orton's aphorism: 11 the concept of the passive, reactive judge is no longer "rational" in the "irrational"
world of burgeoning case loads, swelling backlogs, and extended pretrial procedures. Rather, Judge Learned Hand's
articulation of the judge as an active case manager, as opposed
to an inert moderator, 12 appears now to be the only "rational"
alternative. 13
8.
See id. at 1, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6804 ("The purpose of this
legislation is to promote for all citizens-rich or poor, individual or corporation,
plaintiff or defendant-the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of civil disputes
in our Nation's Federal courts.").
9.
See 28 U.S.C. § 471 (Supp. V 1993). The Act sought to achieve uniform
systemic change in an odd manner: each of the ninety-four federal judicial districts
was empowered to bring forth and experiment with its own individual expense and
delay reduction plan. Id.
10.
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Seen in a Glass Darkly: The Future
of the Federal Courts, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 1, 8.
11. ORTON, supra note 2, at 72.
12. United States v. Marzano, 149 F.2d 923, 925 (2d Cir. 1945) (L. Hand, J.).
13. See Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 171 (1989) ("One of
the most significant insights that skilled trial judges have gained in recent years is
the wisdom and necessity for early judicial intervention in the management of litigation.").
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At root, the Act marks a philosophical departure from the
basic notions of individual autonomy and self-determination,
notions upon which the government of the United States, and
in particular, the federal judicial process, has historically been
based. 14 The idea of a judiciary designed primarily to serve the
needs of the individual, a judiciary that correspondingly placed
the individual litigants at the core of the adjudicative process,
has a firm basis in Anglo-American jurisprudence. 15 Historically, the belief in autonomy, dignity, and primacy of the
individual has suggested that state or societal interests must
necessarily be secondary to the interests of the individual in
the adjudicative process. As such, and as will be. discussed
more fully below, individuals traditionally have preserved
their autonomy when invoking the civil judicial apparatus, not
only by determining when to access the judicial process provided by the state, but also by retaining control over all relevant
aspects of this process leading up to the final adjudication of
the dispute. 16
While there has been a growing trend toward procedural
judicial activism in this country for the past twenty to thirty
years, perhaps made most apparent by the advent of the so-

14. This change in some sense mirrors Bruce Ackerman's concept of "Constitutional Moments," which occur when significant constitutional determinations that
result in lasting changes to the fabric of constitutional interpretation are made,
although, at the time these moments occurred, it was not self-evident that they would
be of enduring significance. Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/ Constitutional
Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 486 (1989) (discussing "political movements [that] have
mobilized popular consent to new constitutional solutions"); cf. United States v.
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1657 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Not every epochal case
has come in epochal trappings."). The CJRA signifies not so much a "constitutional
moment" as it does an official legislative acceptance of a series of such judicially
implemented moments, as well as a furtherance of the changes suggested by these
moments.
15. Historically, the notion of adjudication in this country has been predicated
on the idea that social and economic arrangements were based on the actions of
autonomous individuals and were not actively imposed upon society by the government. The civil justice system in this country was designed with this approach in
mind. See infra Part I.B.
16. As a practical matter, of course, this assertion cannot be wholly true. Certain
procedural rules are imposed upon the parties to aid the judiciary in the administration of justice, and the parties are obliged to comply with these rules. These rules
should be, and generally are, nonsubstantive and content-neutral under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, to enable the judiciary to hear cases and administer
justice efficiently, the Federal Rules set parameters on party conduct, and the parties
forfeit some of their individual autonomy when they opt to invoke the judicial
process. Although such forfeiture results in an increase in actual individual autonomy
by allowing the judicial apparatus to function, it creates the appearance of a net loss
of some individual autonomy. See infra Part II.
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called public law model of judicial administration, 17 the CJRA
is a significant legislative acknowledgment that such activism
is needed to address the increasingly complex problems of
judicial management. 18 Through the Act's provisions, Congress
not only placed its stamp of approval upon active court involvement in areas of adjudication that traditionally have been
the exclusive realm of the parties, but also deemed such
judicial intervention to be a necessary part of modern federal
civil litigation. 19 By doing so, Congress implicitly recognized
that a curtailment of individual procedural rights was necessary to effect a net increase in individual substantive liberty.
That is, while the CJRA demands the reduction of certain
adjudicatory values long considered primary elements of
common law litigation, it does so based on the theory that
such limitations are necessary to allow better access to a more
meaningful system of justice.
· The purpose of this Article is to discuss some significant
implications of the CJRA. Part I puts the theoretical assumptions of the Act in context by considering two different models
for the administration and resolution of civil disputes: (1) the
passive judiciary model stemming from the political philosophy
of, among others, Locke and Blackstone, and (2) the activist
model, which is pervasive in continental Europe. Using these
two models as opposing reference points, Part II examines the
movement in America from one model of judicial involvement,
the judge as umpire, toward another, the judge as case man-·
ager. Part III considers the role of the CJRA in this movement. After tracing the relevant background of the CJRA, Part
III then outlines the implementation of the Act and delineates
the principles of civil justice administration on which the Act
rests. It discusses the contributions that the Act has made,
and will likely make, in furthering the movement toward a
17. Id.
18. The legislature, of course, has approved amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, but these amendments were drafted by the judiciary pursuant to
the Rules Enabling Act, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 961 (1948) (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). The CJRA, on the other hand, was a legislative effort
from start to finish. For a more detailed discussion of the relationship between the
powers conferred by the Rules Enabling Act and the mandates of the Civil Justice
Reform Act, see Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural Justice,
77 MINN. L. REV. 375 (1992).
19. See, e.g., McGovern, supra note 5, at 442 ("Underlying trends in litigation
management and alternative dispute resolution are radical shifts in theories of the
relative functions of judges and attorneys .... The new model of the judge's role
suggests that dispute resolution shouid not be left largely to attorneys and parties. n).
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more procedurally active judiciary. Finally, Part III examines
the Act's expanded procedural limitations on litigants in advancing the role of the judge as case manager, and questions
whether the Act will increase the real degree of autonomy and
liberty for individuals by furthering the ability of individuals
to avail themselves more fruitfully of the federal adjudicative
process.

I. Two METHODS OF ADMINISTERING JUSTICE
The Civil Justice Reform Act is the foremost manifestation
of a national movement toward more active judicial management of federal litigation. This movement signals a departure
from the traditional concept of adjudication in the AngloAmerican tradition. Historically,judges have been passive and
neutral. Their role has been to provide a forum for individuals
-who have long been the dominant players in the adjudicative process-to bring about an acceptable resolution to their
disputes in a civil fashion. A well-established philosophical
tradition supports this view of the judiciary.
A. The Passive Versus the Active
Administration of Justice
At the extremes, there are two quite different models by
which a state can administer justice. At one end of the continuum is a judiciary that is truly passive, which serves
merely to provide a forum in which adversarial parties resolve
conflict. In such a state, individual autonomy and self-realization are the primary values, and individual rights are held
absolute. Law serves only as a suggested approach to arranging individual relationships, and it is easily displaced if the
parties agree to be governed by other rules of conduct. The
American system of adjudication historically has reflected this
fundamental notion; in many ways, however, the provisions of
the CJRA run contrary to this antecedent of our judicial system. 20

20. See Abraham Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1282-83 (1976). As will be discussed, there is a recent history
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At the other end of the continuum is the activist state,
where the judiciary itself, often due to its own interest in the
proceeding, is an active player in the administration ofjustice.
Such a structure of judicial administration is frequently called
"inquisitorial," and under such a system political values tend
to be imposed upon the judicial process. 21 The inquisitorial
system evolved primarily in continental Europe, and some
version of it now dominates the judicial systems in most parts
of the world. 22

B. The Philosophical Foundations of the
American Judicial System
1. The Passive, Reactive State-Dispute resolution in the
United States traditionally has followed the model of the passive state. The role of the· judge has been that of neutral,
passive decision maker whose tribunal exists solely to allow
autonomous individuals to vindicate their rights under law. 23

of civil justice that comports with the philosophical tenor of the CJRA, and which perhaps served as a springboard to the codification of the Act. For example, revisions to
Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure over the past 20 years have increased
the activist role of the judge. See, e.g., Richey, supra note 6, at 603 (noting that "in
Rule 16 the drafters endorsed-if not by mandating aggressive judicial involvement,
then by at least expressly permitting such involvement-the managerial model of
judging"). In addition, several scholars have considered the advent of "managerial
judges" in the United States, particularly with reference to public law litigation, to
be a step toward a more inquisitorial system. See, e.g., Chayes, supra, at 1296-98
(discussing the heightened role of the judge in fact-finding in public law litigation);
Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376, 376-80 (1982) (discussing
the increased role that judges play in all stages oflitigation). For a further discussion
of this trend and other activist trends in the American administration of justice, see
infra Part II.
21. See Mn!JAN R DAMASK.\, THE FACF.8 OF JUSTICE AND STATE AtmIORI'lY 82 (1986)
("Rather than emanating from civil society and mirroring its practice, activist law
springs from the state and expresses its policies. The controlling image oflaw is that
of the state decree, wholly divorced from contractarian notions.").
22. See generally ARTHUR ENGELMANN ET AL, A HlsToRY OF CONTINENTAL CML PRoCEDURE (Robert W. Miller trans., 1927) (discussing the development of civil procedure
in the individual countries of continental Europe).
23. See Hubert L. Will, Judicial Responsibility for the Disposition of Litigation,
75 F.R.D. 89, 117, 121 (1976) ("Judges for centuries have thought that they were just
supposed to be skilled referees who would step into the ring when the lawyer combatants said they were ready to fight .... When a case came to trial, how it was developed before trial, whether there had been adequate preparation for trial, whether the
case had to be tried at all, none of these things were of concern to the judge."); Roscoe
Pound, Do We Need a Philosophy of Law?, 5 COLUM. L. REV. 339, 347 (1905) ("[T)he
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Judges do not serve to implement policy; rather, they serve
primarily to provide a mechanism for social self-management.
Legal procedure is thus designed in a policy-neutral way. 24
Judges do not take a dominant role in the judicial process.
Instead, the litigants have traditionally been left to control
this process: litigants may initiate an action by filing a lawsuit,25 join26 or intervene 27 in lawsuits, and control the factfinding process. 28 Procedural rules designed by the state to
govern the dispute are generally waiveable on party consent. 29
If such a party-dominated system results in less than an optimal view of the truth, the truth must be subordinated to the
necessity of protecting these individual rights. 30 With the
common-law theory of litigation is that of a fair fist fight, ... with a court to see fair
play and prevent interference .... We strive in every way to restrain the trial judge
and to insure the individual litigants a fair fight, unhampered by mere considerations
of justice.n); Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology, and the Euolution of the Aduersary
System, 64 IND. L.J. 301, 302 (1989) ("The adversary system is characterized ... by
a passive decisionmaker who merely listens to both sides and renders a decision
based on what she has heard.n). As Professor Judith Resnik has noted, even typical
artistic renderings portray "justice" as even-handed and neutral. Resnik, supra note
20, at 382-83.
24. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose ofManifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy ofNon-Trans-Substantiue Rules ofCiuil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067, 2074-87 (1989). This notion of substance-neutral
procedure, however, has been much challenged in regard to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which have often been criticized as incorporating value judgments into
facially-neutral rules. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discouery Vices and TransSubstantiue Virtues in the Federal Rules of Ciuil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237,
2246-47 (1989) (arguing that despite their facial neutrality, the Federal Rules have
been used to facilitate "social justice litigationn); see also McGovern, supra note 5, at
450 ("[P]rocedures are rarely value-neutral, whether or not we believe that they
should be. Any procedure-regardless of the nature of the underlying dispute or the
method by which procedures are applied-will affect the outcome of a case."). For an
extensive critique of the impact of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Symposium, The 50th Anniuersary of the Federal Rules of Ciuil Procedure, 1938-1988, 137
U. PA. L. REV. 1873 (1989).
25.
FED. R. CIV. P. 3 (a litigant invokes a civil action "by filing a complaint with
the court").
26.
FED. R. CIV. P. 19.
27.
FED. R. CIV. P. 24.
28.
The trial judge historically had little or no power over either the fact-finding
process or the organization of the adjudicative process. See, e.g., Chayes, supra note
20, at 1286; Marvin E. Frankel, The Aduersary Judge, 54 TEX. L. REv. 465, 468
(1976).
29. See, e.g., DAMA$KA, supra note 21, at 99-100. In the American system of
justice, however, the abi.ity to waive a right is not always absolute. Cf., e.g., Singer
v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34-35 (1965) (discussing a criminal defendant's right
to waive trial by jury, and holding that "[t)he ability to waive a constitutional right
does not ordinarily carry with it the right to insist upon the opposite of that right").
30.
Such a view is evident in the realm of criminal procedure. The "truth" often
is placed second to maintaining certain individual rights, such as the right to avoid
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passage of the CJRA, Congress has moved the adjudicative
process in the United States away from this traditional model
of party-dominated justice.31
2. The Influence of Locke-The passive model of adjudication dates back in Anglo-American thought at least as far
as Locke and Blackstone. Indeed, the fundamental importance
of Locke's natural law philosophy stems from his use of natural law concepts to validate individual rights as primary in
civil society. Notably, in The Second Treatise of Government,
Locke's earlier notions of natural law are transformed from a
universalistic concept to one that emphasizes the natural
rights of individuals in relation to the state. 32 That is, the
right of individuals to secure life, liberty, and estate become
primary in Locke's philosophy. 33
The principal structure of Locke's argument in the Second
Treatise runs roughly as follows: civil government begins with
a contract, and this contract puts an end to the existing prepolitical state known as the state of nature. For Locke,
[t]he state of nature has a law of nature to govern it which
obliges every one; and reason, which is that law, teaches
all mankind who will but consult it that, being all equal
and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life,
health, liberty, or possessions; for men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent and infinitely wise Maker ...
and being furnished with like faculties, sharing all in one

unreasonable searches; therefore, evidence improperly obtained is excluded from trial.
See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961) ("[T]he [rights to] freedom from unconscionable invasions of privacy and the freedom from convictions based upon coerced
confessions . . . [dictate] that no man is to be convicted on unconstitutional evidence.") (citations omitted); FED. R. Evm. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice .... ");see also DAMASKA, supra note 21, at 105 ("(S]o seriously is autonomy
taken in the reactive state that it is protected even in those instances where the
parties' exercise of autonomy seriously strains the optimal functioning of legal
process designed as a contest.").
31. The CJRA, while the most prominent, is not the first attempt to mandate
increased judicial management of the adjudicative process. See infra Part II. Amendments to Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also have sought to encourage greater case management by the judge. See infra text accompanying notes
128-34.
32. See JOHN LoCKE, The Second Treatise ofCiuil Government, in Two TREATISES
OF GoVERNMENT 184 (Thomas I. Cook ed., 1947).
33. See EDWARDS. CoRWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 61 (1955) (discussing the impact of Locke's Second Treatise on natural
law in American constitutional theory).
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community of nature, there cannot be supposed any such
subordination among us that may authorize us to destroy
another, as if we were made for one another's uses as the
inferior ranks of creatures are for ours. 34
In the state of nature, all people were free and independent.
The sole restraining force in such a state was one,s own reason, and the use of reason assured that an individual's actions
always conformed to nature. 35 Individuals entered into relationships with one another, and the state of nature insured
the peace. Maintaining the peace, however, is dependent upon
humans acting in accordance with the dictates of reason, 36 and
people are not always rational. As a result, individuals wrong
each other, thus creating the prospect of war in an otherwise
peaceful state. 37 This prospect of war was one reason why
people chose to leave the state of nature. 38
A second distinct reason led individuals to choose to leave
the state of nature. Even when one chooses to act rationally
according to the laws of nature, one may not be wholly successful in doing so. This is because the state of nature lacks
"an established, settled, known law, received and allowed by
common consent to be the standard of right and wrong and the
common measure to decide all controversies between them. "39
Since no moral law is implanted in us, the only way for one to
come to know law in the state of nature is to study it, which
not all do. A further complication stems from the fact that in
the state of nature, "every man hath a right to punish the
offender and be executioner of the law of nature."40 Thus, "[i]n
the state of nature there wants a known and indifferent judge
with authority to determine all differences according to the
established law; for every one in that state being both judge
and executioner ... passion and revenge is very apt to carry
them too far. "41
For these reasons, individuals made a contract in which they
agreed to make a new state by relinquishing the power each

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

LoCKE, supra note 32, at 123.
Id. at 123-24.
Id.
Id. at 130.
Id. at 131, 184.
Id. at 184.
Id. at 125.
Id. at 184.
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held in the state of nature and by allowing the state apparatus
to perform these functions instead. 42 After forming this social
contract, Locke believed that individuals were better off than
before. While the individual right to punish fellow citizens had
been relinquished by leaving the state of nature, all other
rights remained intact, including the naturally derived rights
to life, liberty, and property. Indeed, the entire purpose of
creating civil society was to safeguard these natural rights
more effectively. 43
In Locke's theory, it is significant that upon individuals'
decision to enter civil society, their natural rights such as life,
liberty, and property were increased because people were free
to enjoy them, which they had not been free to do in the state
of nature. While in the state of nature there may have been
more theoretical liberty, in actuality, civil society increased
the amount of net, practical liberty. 44
Because civil society is designed to protect innate rights, the
preservation of these rights becomes the criteria for judging all
acts. of government and all laws of the state. The fundamental
rights of the individual that emanate from the state of nature
determine the validity of the laws of the civil state; the laws
of the civil state do not create fundamental rights. 45
Ultimately for Locke, the civil state is the sum of the individuals who comprise it. Natural law is a backdrop both to
describe the origin of individual rights and to assure that
these rights are elevated to primary status when the civil
state is organized. Indeed, the main purpose of the state is to

42.

As Locke stated:

Whenever, therefore, any number of men are so united into one society as to
quit every one hie executive power of the law of nature and to resign it to the
public, there and there only is a political or civil society. And this is done
wherever any number of men, in the state of nature, enter into society to make
one people, one body politic, under one supreme government .... And this puts
men out of a state of nature into that of a commonwealth ... .

Id. at 164.
43. See id. at 186.
44. See MAURICE CRANSTON, JOHN LoCI<E 210 (1957). Thie point has important
implications for the CJRA. The CJRA will bring about a decrease in procedural
autonomy with the hope of bringing about a net gain in substantive liberties. See
infra Part III.
45. See HEINRICH A. RoMMEN, THE NATURAL LAW 89 (Thomas R. Hanley trans.,
1947) (explaining that according to Locke's philosophy an individual's rights exist
prior to the creation of the State).
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protect individual self-interests. The state exists for individual, not community, concerns.
3. The Influence of Blackstone-William Blackstone's
Commentaries on the Laws of England followed the Lockean
philosophy that government exists to protect the individual. 46
Blackstone's extension of Locke's natural law philosophy greatly influenced the formative era of the American constitution. 47
For Blackstone, as for Locke, protection of individual liberty
is the animating force for civil government:
This natural liberty consists properly in a power of acting
as one thinks fit, without any restraint or control, unless
by the law of nature; being a right inherent in us by birth
.... Political, therefore, or civil liberty, which is that of a
member of society, is no other than natural liberty, so far
restrained by human laws (and no farther) as is necessary
and expedient for the general advantage of the publick. 48
Yet Blackstone differed from Locke in significant and influential ways. Blackstone rejected the notion that human beings
had once lived in a state of nature, maintaining instead that
individuals have always been social beings. 49 In addition,
although he recognized that natural liberty is a right inherent
at birth, he asserted that upon entering civil society, one is
required to relinquish it, at least in part, "as the price of so
valuable a purchase. "5 From this principle, Blackstone arrived
at an image of the state that differed vastly from Locke's. The
major differences in Blackstone's theory include: (1) that every
state must have a supreme, uncontrolled authority; (2) that
this authority is the "natural inherent right that belongs to
the sovereignty of a state"; and (3) that all other powers in
society must conform to the law-making powers of the state. 51

°

46.
See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 124-25 (2d
ed., 1766). But cf. JEREMY BENTHAM, A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARlES 41 (Charles
W. Everett ed., 1928) ("In consequence of which ... [Blackstone] has not perplexed
the law of nature with a multitude of abstracted rules and precepts, referring merely
to the fitness and unfitness of things ... but has graciously reduced the rule of
obedience to this one paternal precept, 'that man should pursue his own happiness'.").
47.
See CORWIN, supra note 33, at 84-88.
48.
BLACKSTONE, supra note 46, at 125.
49.
Id. at 44.
50.
Id. at 125.
51. Id. at 47-51.
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For Blackstone, the civil state, in contradistinction to Locke's
theory, is the final source of the law:
It hath sovereign and uncontrollable authority in making,
confirming ... and expounding of laws ... this being the
place where that absolute, despotic power, which must in
all governments reside somewhere, is entrusted by the constitution of these kingdoms. All mischiefs and grievances
... are within the reach of this extraordinary tribunal. ...
It can, in short, do every thing that is not naturally impossible. . . . True it is, that what the parliament doth, no
authority upon earth can undo. 52

4. The Declaration of Independence-The natural law
theory of individual rights that followed from the philosophies
of Locke and Blackstone was a dominant intellectual theme
during the formative era of the American constitution. 53 This
is perhaps best illustrated by the Declaration of Independence,
in which Thomas Jefferson attempted to speak for the prevailing mind-set of the time. A believer in the Lockean tradition,
Jefferson wrote that the rights of the people are "derived from
the laws of nature, and [are] not the gift of their Chief Magistrate. "54 Hence, "[i]t is not only vain, but wicked, in a legislator to frame laws in opposition to the laws of nature."55
Unlike the final version, Jefferson's draft of the Declaration
of Independence spoke expressly of the inherent nature of
individual rights. The draft reads:
We hold these truths to be self evident: that all men are
created equal; that they are endowed by their creator with
[certain inherent and inalienable] rights; that among these
are life, liberty, & the pursuit of happiness: that to secure
these rights, governments are instituted among men,
deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that whenever any form of government becomes
destructive to these ends, it is the right of the people to
alter or to abolish it, & to institute new government, laying it's foundation on such principles, & organising it's

52.

53.
54.
55.

Id. at 160-61.
See CORWIN, supra note 33, at 61 (Locke); id. at 84-85 (Blackstone).
THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE JEFFERSONIAN CYCLOPEDIA 691 (John P. Foley ed., 1900).
Id. at 486.
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powers in such form: as to them shall seem most likely to
effect their safety & happiness. 56
This paragraph is Lockean in the purest sense. Nature provides individuals with inherent rights; to better assure themselves of these natural rights-and for no other reason-people
form civil governments. It follows that governments exist not
only to benefit the governed, but exist solely by the decree and
consent of the governed. The people retain ultimate authority
to insure the vitality of their individual rights. If the government oversteps its bounds in this regard, the people can
dissolve it. It is upon such a theory that the American adjudicative system was based. 57

C. Two Models of Dispute Resolution
1. The Adversarial Model and the Passive State-Dispute
resolution in the United States traditionally has adhered to a
belief in the primacy of individual autonomy and self-realization as espoused by Locke. In accordance with these ideals, the
state's apparatus for the administration ofjustice has been designed to provide a framework by which individuals can resolve
their disputes in a civil manner, without going to war, as they
would in the state of nature. This allows individuals to maintain the maximum autonomy possible in their pursuit of selfdetermination. 58 Theoretically, no state values come to the fore

56.

Thomas Jefferson, Draft of The Declaration of Independence, reprinted in

GARY WILLS, INvENTING AMERICA 374 (1978).

57. The Supreme Court has at times enunciated a very pure form of the Lockean
conception of civil justice. For example, a classic Lockean pronouncement appears in
Canada S. Ry. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527, 536 (1883):
Every member of a political community must necessarily part with some of the
rights which, as an individual, not affected by his relation to others, he might
have retained. Such concessions make up the consideration he gives for the
obligation of the body politic to protect him in life, liberty, and property.
Id.
58. See Chayes, supra note 20, at 1285 ("The traditional conception of adjudication
... assumed that the major social and economic arrangements would result from the
activities of autonomous individuals. In such a setting, the courts' . . . primary
function was the resolution of disputes about the fair implications of individual
interactions.").
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in such a system. 59 Rather, those state values required to form
the mechanism needed to administer justice are only "surrogate values" they espouse only the interests upon which
individuals would agree were they so able to contract. 60 Under
such a view, the only legitimate goal of a system of justice is
to establish a format by which individual members of civil
society may autonomously regulate their own behavior.
As an outgrowth of this notion, the civil justice system in
the United States has traditionally made the litigants-not
the state or its embodiment, the judge-the dominant
figures in the legal process. 61 For example, individuals
determine when to invoke the judicial process; they control
fact-finding; they are involved in setting the pace of the
process; and they are generally free to waive state-designed
protective rules. 62 Such a system best preserves individual
autonomy in a number of important aspects. 63 Perhaps most
importantly, it allows the litigants to make their own case

59.
In reality, certain "content-neutral" values, such as the promotion of efficient
judicial administration, are incorporated into the fabric of the civil justice system in
the United States. There has been much debate over whether such values, as incorporated into the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, are in fact content-neutral. See supra
note 24.
60.
See DAMASKA, supra note 21, at 76 ("Where the state embraces no independent
value system or policies ... [t]he only legitimate route the lawgiver can take is to try
to determine how citizens would have agreed to resolve a matter had they anticipated
it; social expectations must be captured and defined:).
61. This has been the case throughout the history of Anglo-American civil litigation. From as early as the twelfth century, parties have assumed primary responsibility for initiating legal proceedings and for defining the issues in .their pleadings.
See 2 FREDERICK PoWX:K & F'REoERic W. MAm.AND, THE HlsroRY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFoRE
THE TIME OF EDWARD I 604-05 (1911).

62.
The party-dominated system of adjudication, which is in reality a lawyerdominated system, has been subject to criticism. The most common critiques have
been that a system controlled by the parties provides incentives to distort evidence
and includes overly complex forms of discovery and trial presentation. See, e.g.,
J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 80-85 (1950)

(contrasting the adversarial process with the search for truth in adjudication);
Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031,
1032 (1975) (arguing that the adversary system makes finding the truth too low a
priority). As a result, truth may be sacrificed to preserve other ends. These ends, as
have been discussed, are precisely those values of autonomy and self-determination
that we as a society profess to hold dear. The CJRA is designed in part to address
some of these criticisms ·of party-dominated adjudication.
63.
In the enormously complex and time-consuming realm of civil litigation in
the United States, individuals often cede to their attorneys significant amounts of
control over their dispute. Some may question whether under such a system individual dignity and autonomy are in fact preserved. See, e.g., Sward, supra note 23, at
317-18.
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in court to the fullest extent that they deem appropriate,
rather than at the direction of the judge. 64
2. The Inquisitorial Model and the Activist State-The
activist state is identified most frequently with an inquisitorial system of justice. In contrast to the adversarial system, the
inquisitorial system of justice is notable for two significant
and related characteristics. First, a hearing judge is the dominant actor in gathering evidence and questioning witnesses. 65
Second, a judge is the central player in the adjudicatory
process. 66
Some form of civil law justice is used· throughout most of
continental Europe. 67 A typical civil law proceeding is divided
into three distinct stages, with a judicial officer dominating
the latter two stages. 68 In a civil law jurisdiction, just as under
the common law, the parties control the initial stage of an

64. See STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYsTEM: A DESCRIPl'ION AND DEFENSE
44-45 (1984) ("Ultimately, the whole procedure yields results tailored to the litigants'
needs and in this way reinforces individual rights."); see also Lon L. Fuller, The
Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 382-83 (1978). Fuller
presents an argument that adversary presentation, as opposed to the European
inquisitorial model, is fundamental to an appropriate adjudicative process. Id. He
contends that the integrity of this process demands the presence at trial of an
advocate rather than solely an arbiter. Id. at 382. An arbiter would sacrifice her
neutrality by the necessity of creating and presenting the case for each litigant. Id.
Such a process could hardly allow an arbiter to regain neutrality. Id. at 382-83. As
Fuller noted, "[l]f it is true that a man in his time must play many parts, it is
scarcely given to him to play them all at once." Id. at 383.
65. JOHN H. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 111 (1985). Fact-finding may
proceed over a period of time, as the judge gathers as much information, but no more,
than he feels is necessary to reach a decision. Parties act in the fact-finding process
by suggesting witnesses and avenues to explore; however, they neither interrogate
witnesses, nor, frequently, meet with witnesses in advance. Id. at 115-17; Mirjan
Dama!ika, Presentation of Evidence and Factfinding Precision, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
1083, 1088-89 (1975); Benjamin Kaplan et al., Phases of German Civil Procedure I,
71 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1234-35 (1958).
66. See MERRYMAN, supra note 65, at 36 (describing the civil law judge as
"operator of a machine designed and built by legislators"). Some commentators argue
that such a dominant judicial presence is necessary to provide a level playing field
for parties of inherently unequal strength. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984). For example, Professor Fiss notes that an activist
judge "can employ a number of measures to lessen the impact of distributional
inequalities. He can, for example, supplement the parties' presentations by asking
questions, calling his own witnesses, and inviting other persons and institutions to
participate as amici." Id. at 1077.
67. See Sward, supra note 23, at 301 ("The majority of the world ... uses some
version of the inquisitorial system that evolved primarily in continental Europe.").
See generally ENGELMANN ET AL., supra note 22 (discussing the development of civil
procedure in continental Europe).
68.
MERRYMAN, supra note 65, at 111.
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action by invoking the judicial process when they file pleadings. 69 At the second stage a hearing judge views the evidence
and prepares a written record of the findings. 70 Noticeably
absent from this evidentiary stage in civil law proceedings is
a broad-based, party-controlled discovery process. Americanstyle discovery is virtually unknown in civil law jurisdictions. 71
In the third stage, the record prepared by the hearing judge is
transmitted to the judicial decision makers who make a final
decision based on the written record prepared by the hearing
judge, counsels' briefs, and oral arguments from counsel. 72
Civil law procedure thus does not recognize a clear delineation between the preparatory stages of an action and the
actual trial. 73 Furthermore, civil law procedure differs from
common law procedure in that it speaks of "instruction" and
"modes of proof' rather than of evidence. 74 This civil law terminology reflects the notion that the judicial decision makers
should merely be informed of the pertinent facts, rather than
be persuaded by the presentation of evidence, as is the case in
common law jurisdictions. 75
Professor John Langbein has argued for the comparative
advantage of the civil law system of civil procedure, using the
German legal system for illustration. 76 Langbein's central
thesis is that by allowing judges rather than lawyers to
69.
Id.
70. Id.
71. See, e.g.• PETER HERZOG, CIVIL PRocEDURE IN FRANCE 233 (1967) (noting that in
France, discovery of documents by the adverse party is possible only in very limited
instances). Some critics have argued that placing major constraints on discovery is
a rational method of dealing with the pretrial discovery explosion in the United
States. See, e.g., Loren Kieve, Discovery Reform, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1991, at 79-81 (arguing that the appropriate solution to the discovery "nightmare" in the United States
is to follow the lead of civil law countries and abandon discovery).
72.
MERRYMAN, supra note 65, at 111-12.
73. J. A. Jolowicz, The Active Role of the Court in Civil Litigation, in PuBLIC
INTEREST PARTIES AND THE ACTIVE RoLE OF THE JUDGE IN CJvn. LITIGATION 246 (Mauro
Cappelletti ed., 1975).
74. Id. at 247.
75. Id. at 247-48.
76. John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L.
REV. 823 (1985) (arguing that, in comparison to German law, American civil procedure produces a system of litigation that is slow, expensive, and unpredictable). But
cf. Ronald J. Allen et al., The German Advantage in Civil Procedure: A Plea for More
Details and Fewer Generalities in Comparative Scholarship, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 705
(1988) (arguing that Langbein's comparison of the American and German systems is
to9 vague and speculative to be persuasive); Samuel R. Gross, The American Advantage: The Value ofInefficient Litigation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 734 (1987) (arguing that the
inefficiency built into the American system provides certain structural and substantive advantages).
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investigate facts and question witnesses, many of the most
troublesome aspects of American civil procedure may be
avoided. 77 In a German civil case, the judge to whom a case is
assigned is the coordinator of the adjudication. 78 After the
initial pleadings have been filed, the judge initiates all subsequent activity of consequence. 79 The judge familiarizes himself
with the case and then summons the lawyers to a pretrial
conference in an effort to resolve the dispute. 80 If a resolution
is not reached, the judge may call witnesses, and the witnesses are questioned primarily by the judge. 81
The primary objective of such a hearing is to reach expediently a socially desirable goal, not necessarily to further or
protect the interests of the particular litigants. 82 Accordingly,
the interests of the parties in a civil suit-whose interests,
after all, were the impetus for the filing of the complaint-are
subordinated to greater societal interests. Such a view is
diametrically opposed to the Lockean view upon which the
American judicial system was founded, namely that the purpose of the state-in this case the judiciary-is to provide a
mechanism to vindicate individual rights, and any other
interests necessarily must be secondary. 83

77.
Langbein, supra note 76, at 824. Langbein notes, however, that aside from
fact-finding, the German system does not differ significantly from the American
model. Id. at 841-42. In both systems, lawyers remain strong advocates for their
clients' positions by suggesting legal theories and proposing lines of factual inquiry.
Id. at 829; cf. Abraham S. Goldstein & Martin Marcus, The Myth of Judicial Super·
vision in Three "Inquisitorial• Systems: France, Italy, and Germany, 87 YALE L.J. 240
(1977) (noting operational similarities among three continental systems and the
American system). But cf. John C. Reitz, Why We Probably Cannot Ad-Opt the German
Advantage in Civil Procedure, 75 IOWA L. REV. 987 (1990) (arguing that judicially
dominated fact-finding, the central characteristic of German procedure, could not be
adopted in the United States without fundamental changes to the essence of
American civil procedure).
78.
Langbein, supra note 76, at 827-29.
79. Id. at 827-29, 837, 839.
80. Id. at 828.
81. Id. at 827-28. But cf. MERRYMAN, supra note 65, at 114-15 (noting that while
German judges are more active, in most civil law jurisdictions, parties have much
more control over what issues are deemed relevant, what evidence is introduced, and
what questions are posed to witnesses).
82. See Langbein, supra note 76, at 828. "Socially desirable" in this context msy
be seen as bringing about those values considered desirable to society at large, rather
than solely advancing the interests of the litigants, who, of course, invoked the
judicial process so that their needs, rather than society's, would be protected. See,
e.g., DAMASKA, supra note 21, at 81-82.
83. See supra notes 32-45 and accompanying text.
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As discussed more fully below, the American model of justice
has departed from its Lockean moorings. This new model,
though still in transition, has begun to a,dopt certain quasiinquisitorial features. The most prominent of these characteristics is the notion of the judge as a case manager, who enters
the litigation at its inception and oversees the matter through
its disposition. 84 In this regard, the CJRA has furthered the
American movement toward a more inquisitorial process. Under the Act, judges are expressly encouraged to meet early and
often with the parties, 85 to explore with the parties the possibilities of settlement, 86 to coordinate discovery schedules and
motion practice with the parties, 87 and to set early and firm
trial dates. 88

II. PROCEDURAL ACTIVISM PRIOR TO THE
CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990
The passive model of adjudication, which embodies the
laissez-faire principles of Locke and Blackstone, has been
largely abandoned in America. 89 It would be misleading to
claim, however, that the CJRA is responsible for this departure. Indeed, by the time the Act was signed into law in 1990,
the concept of case management had been widely accepted both
as an ad hoc method for meeting the exigencies of particular
cases90 and as a formal component of the pretrial process, as
reflected in Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 91

84. For a survey of modem American techniques in pretrial case management,
see FEDERAL JUDICIAL CEN'mR, MANuAL FOR LmGATION MANAGEMENT AND COST AND DELAY
REDUCTION 5-37 (1993).
85.
28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(2) (Supp. V 1993).
86. § 4 73(a)(3)(A), (b)(5).
87. § 473(a)(2).
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., Robert F. Peckham, A Judicial Response to the Cost of Litigation:
Case Management, Two Stage Discovery Planning and Alternative Dispute Resolution,
37 RUTGERS L. REV. 253, 266 (1985) ("[T)he cause of justice can no longer be served by
a laissez-faire judicial model. Our controlled inaction is an affirmative choice, an
abdication of our responsibility to use our power to assist in restoring the health of
the system.").
90. See sources cited supra note 6.
91. Rule 16 establishes procedures for the pretrial management of the litigation.
See also Charles R. Richey, Rule 16 Revisited: Reflections for the Benefit ofBench and
Bar, 139 F.R.D. 525, 526 (1992) ("Rule 16 contains enormous potential as a device for
developing creative case management strategies. I believe that Rule 16 is the most
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As one commentator blithely stated in 1986, "[T]he managerial
horse is out of the judicial barn."92
The Act is therefore part of a larger movement toward a
more procedurally active judiciary. This subsidiary role, however, does not detract from the Act's significance. Rather, the
importance of the Act derives from the fact that the legislature
saw the need to mandate procedural reforms in the context of
a judicial movement that was already implementing many of
these same methods. 93 Thus, in addition to the national reforms it seeks to achieve, the Act is significant, not in spite of
the pre-existence of the judicial activist movement, but be:..
cause of it.
A. The Rise of Case Management
As discussed in Part I, the adjudicatory system that was an
outgrowth of Lockean and Blackstonian philosophy existed
solely for the resolution of private disputes between private
individuals regarding the allocation of private rights. 94 Many
developments in twentieth-century America led to the breakdown of this private law model. 95 This transformation occurred
primarily in the latter half of the twentieth century. 96 The most

important rule of civil procedure for a trial judge, because, along with our inherent
power, it is the specific repository of the authority of a federal trial judge to manage
the judicial calendar.").
92.
McGovern, supra note 5, at 440; see also E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 306, 322 (1986) ("Managerial
judging has spread rapidly from one judge to another because many trial judges share
a sense of frustration at the amorphous sprawl oflitigation under the Federal Rules
and are anxious to try new ways of bringing cases to issue.").
93.
Indeed, it is arguable that all of the managerial techniques necessary for
managing the litigation process were available to judges before the enactment of the
CJRA. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Ciuil Justice Reform and the Balkanization of Federal
Civil Procedure, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1393, 1397 (1992) ("The 1983 revisions of the
Federal Rules and the 1985 issuance of the Manual for Complex Litigation Second
effectively codified virtually all of the managerial judging techniques that courts had
created.").
94. See supra Part l.C.1.
95.
See, e.g., Peckham, supra note 6, at 770 ("[T]oday's massive volume of litigation and the skyrocketing costs of attorney's fees and other litigation expenses have,
by necessity, cast the trial judge in a new role, that of pretrial manager.").
96. See Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U.
CHI. L. REV. 494, 512 (1986) ("The nineteen-thirties were ... the era before implied
private causes of action, before the rise of civil rights litigation, before much federal
court hospitality towards rights seekers, before intensive litigation against federal
agencies, before the reformulation of the class action rule, before the 'due process'
revolution.").
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notable aspect of this transformation was the rise of public law
disputes, which often involved actions seeking prospective
institutional reform, such as desegregation or the improvement
of state facilities, and which required ongoing, post-trial
oversight by the judge assigned to the case. 97
The public law model of litigation revolutionized much of the
accepted structure of legal adjudication. It expanded many of
the limiting assumptions of traditional civil litigation, including the propositions that the courts were to serve only to
vindicate the private rights of private parties, that lawsuits be
bipolar, that legal actions retrospectively address acts that
have been completed in their entirety, that the right violated
and the remedy requested necessarily be interdependent, and
that the suit be both party-instituted and party-controlled. 98
The public law model grew out of the creation or expansion
of federal rights, both statutory and constitutional, which
sought to effect systemic social change. 99 Many judges determined that the federal courts bore the responsibility to ensure
that these changes were properly implemented once a violation
of those rights had been established. 100 This responsibility
entailed active judicial management of the litigation both
before and after trial. The judge had to become sufficiently
familiar with the institution in question to determine whether
a federal violation had occurred, and if there was a violation,
the judge had to preside over any post-trial proceedings
brought to enforce compliance with the injunctive remedy
imposed. 101

97. See Resnik, supra note 20, at 393 ("Post-trial judicial management is also a
creature, in part, of a shift ... in the use of lawsuits by diverse groups to assert novel
legal rights. n). While the discussion here addresses the case management role as being
wholly judicial, judges are also empowered to designate others, such as a special
master, to serve in this role. E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 53(a), (c) (permitting the court to
appoint special masters with broad discovery powers). The policy arguments remain
largely unchanged when a judicial designee assumes the judicial management
function.
98. See Chayes, supra note 20, at 1282-84 (comparing traditional concepts of
litigation with modem features of public law litigation).
99. See, e.g., Langton v. Johnston, 928 F.2d 1206, 1221 (1st Cir. 1991) ("At least
since the time of Brown v. Board of Education, district courts have exercised broad
powers and enjoyed great latitude in regulating the operations of state institutions,
ranging from school districts, to hospitals, to prisons, as may be necessary to enforce
federally assured rights. n) (citation omitted).
100. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1989 Term-Leading Cases, 104 HARV. L. REV.
129, 296-97 & nn. 1, 5 (1990) (discussing the use of the public law consent decree).
101. See, e.g., Langton, 928 F.2d at 1210-11 (tracing the implementation and
enforcement ·of a consent decree as applied to conditions at a state prison facility).
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Professor Abram Chayes, in his seminal article, The Role of
the Judge in Public Law Litigation, recognized the rise in
public law litigation and its transform.ative effects on the
function of the judiciary. 102 Chayes called this model "public
law litigation," and noted that the defining characteristics of
private civil litigation had become inapplicable in an age when
civil litigation was aimed increasingly at the vindication of
public, federal rights. 103 In the public law model, the nature of
the adjudicative process was fundamentally inverted from the
traditional framework, and nowhere so much as in the role of
the neutral, passive decision maker. 104 Not only had the nature
of the litigants gone from fixed and stable to widespread and
amorphous, but the judge had become the single dominant
player in organizing and directing the case, as well as in
fashioning nontraditional and creative remedies. 105
At the center of these remedies was the consent decree: a
judicial order prescribing a course of future conduct for the
institution or system named in the suit. 106 The formulation of
this decree, as well as the oversight needed to ensure compliance with it, required the assigned judge to become both a
procedural and substantive case manager. 107 In Professor
Chayes's view, such active involvement in the affairs of public
institutions transformed the federal judge from a passive
arbiter into a governmental policymaker:
[A] judicial decree establishing an ongoing affirmative
regime of conduct is pro tanto a legislative act. . . . [I]n
actively shaping and monitoring the decree, mediating
between the parties, developing his own sources of expertise and information, the trial judge has passed beyond
even the role of legislator and has become a policy planner
and manager. 108

102. See Chayes, supra note 20; see also Richard L. Marcus, Public Law Litigation
and Legal Scholarship, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 64 7 (1988) (discussing the impact of the
Chayes article).
103. Chayes, supra note 20, at 1284.
104. Id. at 1298.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1284.
107. Id. at 1284, 1300.
108. Id. at 1302; see also Langton v. Johnston, 928 F.2d 1206, 1221 (1st Cir. 1991)
("In public law litigation, courts typically play a proactive role-a role which can have
nearly endless permutations.... The reliefrequested often involves the restructuring
of a state or city program, requiring the court to fashion equitable remedies-sometimes unique and often· complicated-in order to secure 'complex legal goals.' ")
(citations omitted).
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In addition to the public law movement, other forces also
caused federal judges to become more active participants in
the suits brought before them. The introduction of liberal
discovery rules in the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
was one such force. 109 By allowing for broad discovery in an
otherwise adversarial environment, the Federal Rules sowed
the seeds for active pretrial case management. Discovery
disputes ultimately became a ·source of frequent pretrial
litigation, as parties sought judicial involvement to counter
perceived abuses by their opponents. 110 This judicial participation in pretrial disputes made courts more amenable to
involvement with other pretrial matters. According to one
commentator, "supervision of discovery became a conduit for
judicial control over all phases of litigation and thus infused
lawsuits with the continual presence ofthejudge-overseer." 111
This need for pretrial judicial oversight was heightened by
the significant growth in case filings beginning in the late
1950s. In the three decades from 1960 to 1990, the number of
lawsuits filed each year almost tripled, from 90,000 in 1960 to
more than 250,000 in 1990. 112 Moreover, the legal profession
in America grew apace. From 1977 to 1989, the legal industry
grew 382 percent. 113 Furthermore, during the 1970s, Congress
increased the opportunities for indigent plaintiffs to bring suit.
In 1974, Congress created the Legal Services Corporation to
provide legal assistance to indigent people; 114 two years later,
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fee Act, 115 which
109. See Peckham, supra note 89, at 256 (discussing the introduction of discovery
rules and their effect on the pretrial process); Resnik, supra note 20, at 391-92
(explaining that the creation of new discovery rights allowed litigants to enlist the
court's help in obtaining requested materials).
110. See, e.g., Peckham, supra note 89, at 256 ("The pressures and incentives of
the litigative process overwhelmed the spirit of the new rules, and discovery abuse
became widespread, particularly in the large cases.").
111. Resnik, supra note 20, at 379.
112. PREsmENT's COUNCIL ON COMPETlTIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIl.. JUSTICE RE.FORM
IN AMERICA 1 (1991)[hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS]. Since
1990, case filings in federal court have continued to grow. According to the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, case filings in 1990 totalled
264,409, whereas filings in 1994 reached 281,740. COMM. ON LoNG RANGE PLANNING,
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., PRoPOSED l.oNG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURrS
11, tbl. 3 (Nov. 1994) (citing statistics furnished by the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts).
113. PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 112, at 2. During the
same period, by contrast, the food industry grew 90.9% while the automotive industry
grew 40.0%. Id.
114. Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-355, § 2, 88 Stat. 378,
378-88 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (1988)).
115. The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, § 2,
90 Stat_. 2641, 2641 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988)).
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provides for one-way fee .shifting in favor of successful plaintiffs who sue under the federal reconstruction-era statutes.
Additionally, the complexity of many federal cases increased
during the 1960 to 1990 period, reflecting the prolific expansion
of federal administrative and statutory rights, both inside and
outside of the public law model. 116 Many of these cases asserted
the rights of wide-ranging classes, which were themselves
made possible by the liberalized procedures of the Federal Rule
governing class actions. 117
Furthermore, amendments to the Federal Rules gave the
judge greater authority to facilitate settlement among the
parties. 118 Such a grant of authority further transformed the
judge's role from a manager of the litigation to a facilitator of
the case's resolution. Modifications made in 1983 to Rule 16
recognized this fact, noting that "it has become commonplace
to discuss settlement at pretrial conferences. Since it obviously
eases crowded court dockets and results in savings to the
litigants and the judicial system, settlement should be facilitated at as early a stage of the litigation as possible. "119

B. Implementing the Case Management Procedures
Prior to the enactment of the CJRA, the judiciary was
predominantly responsible for implementing procedures to
streamline the growing volume of federal cases. In 1969, the
judiciary took one of the first steps toward a more efficient
system when most of the district courts in metropolitan areas
116. See, e.g., CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT ADVISORY GROUP FOR THE U.S. DISTRICT
CoURT FOR THE NORl'HERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, FINAL REPoRT 17 (1993) ("In 1962, much
of the legislation and litigation in the areas of civil rights, Title VII employment
discrimination, pensions, and prisoner litigation did not exist. Thirty years later,
these are among the most frequently filed cases in this district. They are often
among the most time-consuming cases .... n).
117. FED. R. CIV. P. 23; see also Resnik, supra note 96, at 522 ("The revision of the
class action rule has enabled diverse sets of individuals to present themselves as
groups to the federal courts and has prompted extensive consideration of when
representative litigation is permissible. n).
118. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a)(5) (permitting the courts in their discretion to order
pretrial conferences for purposes which include "facilitating the settlement of the
casen).
119. FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee's note (1983); see also Elliott, supra note
92, at 308 ("[M]anagerialjudging has recently become a set of techniques for inducing
settlements. n).
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moved from a master calendar system to an individual assignment program. 120 Under the master calendar approach, a
motion judge or judges would hear pretrial motions in a case
until it was ready for trial; a different judge would then be
assigned to conduct the trial. 121 Under the new system, a judge
was assigned a case from its inception and remained with that
case until its disposition. 122 The transfer to an individual
assignment system had two efficiency rationales. First, by
handling their cases at all stages, judges would become more
familiar with the cases before them, and would therefore
handle both pretrial and trial matters more expeditiously. 123
Second, judges would become motivated to move their cases
more prom~tly because they would be responsible for their own
caseloads. 1 4
Judges also began to recognize the importance of establishing
regular case management procedures. Writing in 1976, Judge
Alvin Rubin emphasized the need for judges to take firm
control of the cases assigned to them.
[P]urely on the basis of twenty-odd years before the bar,
and eleven years on the trial bench, and without being able
to cite data and chart or chapter and verse, I suggest that
there are advantages to judicial assumption ofresponsibility for case control . . . . Better results are achieved by
judges who actively engage in case management than by
those judges who prefer not to meddle with the lawyers. 125
Many judges began to adopt case management procedures as
a result of programs held by the Federal Judicial Center, an
organization created by Congress in 1967 at the recommendation of the Judicial Conference of the United States. 126 The
Federal Judicial Center provided continuing education to existing judges, and it also ran seminars for newly appointed judges
in which the instructors taught the benefits of active case
management. 127

120. Peckham, supra note 89, at 257.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Rubin, supra note 6, at 138.
126. See Act of Dec. 20, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-219, § 101, 81 Stat. 664, 664-68
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 620--629 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
127. See Peckham, supra note 89, at 257-58 (explaining the functions of the Federal
Judicial Center); Will, supra note 23, at 117 (extolling the benefits of active case management at a Federal Judicial Center seminar for newly appointed federal trial judges).

330

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 28:2

The most significant of these case management procedures
was the pretrial status conference. Authorized by Rule 16 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, these conferences allow
the judge to meet with the attorneys for all sides to discuss
matters relating to trial. 128 Although, prior to its amendment
in 1983, Rule 16 focused solely on trial issues, courts began to
use these conferences to address pretrial matters, such as dis·
covery and motions. 129 Indeed, in 1981, Judge Robert Peckham
noted "the increasingly widespread use of the early status
conference" and described it as "a device which enables a judge
to intervene soon after the filing of a case to schedule all the
activity that will occur before trial. "130
In 1983, the Supreme Court greatly expanded the scope of
the pretrial conference under Rule 16. According to the Advi·
sory Committee on the Rules, the amendments sought to make
"scheduling and case management an express goal of pretrial
procedure. "131 This was done by expanding the range of topics
to be discussed at such conferences to cover all aspects of the
pretrial phase, including the prospect of settlement. 132 The
amendments emphasized the need for early and firm judicial
management because studies had shown that cases are re·
solved more efficiently "when a trial judge intervenes person·
ally at an early stage to assume judicial control over a case." 133
Like the CJRA, the 1983 amendments to Rule 16 both
reflected and confirmed the growing movement away from the
passive model of adjudication. Under the revised Rule 16,
judges had express license to work with the parties to coordi·
nate the extent and pace of pretrial activities. According to
Judge Charles Richey, the new Rule 16 signalled a funda·
mental departure from the traditional model of adjudication:

128. FED. R. CIV. P. 16.
129. Peckham, supra note 6, at 771.
130. Id.
131. FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee's note (1983).
132. See id. ("This subdivision [FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)) expands upon the list of
things that may be discussed at a pretrial conference that appeared in original Rule
16. The intention is to encourage better planning and management of litigation.
Increased judicial control during the pretrial process accelerates the processing and
termination of cases.").
133. Id.; see also Robert B. McKay, Rule 16 and Alternative Dispute Resolution,
63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 818, 823 (1988) ("Rule 16 was amended in 1983 to make
specific what bad probably been intended from the beginning-that the trial judge
was indeed the ruler, not only of the pretrial conference, but of the entire pretrial
process.").

WINTER

1995)

The Civil Justice Reform Act

331

In terms of theory, the Rule effectively lays to rest the
historical model of the passive judge-the judge who acts
only, when compelled, and who refuses to sully himself
with the administration of a lawsuit-and replaces it with
a model that is more active, and which is involved with
every aspect of a lawsuit from start to finish. In my view,
this change marks a fundamental alteration in what it
means to be a federal judge. 134
Other commentators voiced similar assessments of Rule 16's
wide grant of authority. 135 Nevertheless, seven years after
these amendments, Congress passed the Civil Justice Reform
Act, which requires all district courts to examine their pretrial procedures to determine whether these methods can be
made more effective through improved judicial case management.136 Absent from the Act is any statement explaining why
Rule 16 is not adequate to achieve the reduction of cost and
delay that the Act seeks. The import of the Act, however, is
clear enough: in the eyes of Congress, the ad hoc procedures
in place throughout the country are insufficient to redress the
problems of cost and delay besetting the nation's civil justice
system as a whole ..137
The emergence of these case management principles, as
embodied in Rule 16, has not met with universal approval. 138
Some argue that such direct, pretrial negotiations undermine
the traditional notion of judicial accountability. They contend
that pretrial meetings and settlement conferences can be held

134. Richey, supra note 6, at 600.
135. See, e.g., Peckham, supra note 89, at 258 ("The present centerpiece of federal
judicial case management is a 1983 amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Rule 16 was amended to codify and encourage the use of case management techniques.") (footnotes omitted); Tobias, supra note 93, at 1397 (noting broad
powers conferred by 1983 amendments to Rule 16).
136. Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 103(a), 104 Stat. 5090 (1990) (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. §§ 471~73 (Supp. V 1993)).
137. Cf. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Congress and the Courts: Our Mutual Obligation,
46 STAN. L. REV. 1285, 1291-92 (1994) (noting that despite the significant reforms
proposed by groups such as the American Bar Association, "the rule changes recommended to Congress by the Judicial Conference remained largely ineffectual");
Patrick Johnston, Civil Justice Reform: Juggling Between Politics and Perfection, 62
FORDHAM L. REV. 833, 845-46 (1994) (discussing the attempted promulgation by the
Judicial Conference of a "14 Point Program").
138. See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 20, at 424 ("In sum, I am skeptical of claims that
management increases judicial productivity at reduced costs .... Moreover, managerial proponents have not even considered the effects of judicial management on the
nature of adjudication.").
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off the record, out of public view, and that judges have no obligation to explain such actions in reasoned, written opinions. 139
Moreover, such extensive meetings with the parties may lead
to biases against particular litigants. 140 Thus, these critics
argue, although judges have seized increasingly greater authority, managerial judging has not included a parallel increase of the procedural safeguards necessary to combat
potential abuses of such authority. 141
While an evaluation of the merits or demerits of the case
management approach is beyond the scope of this Article, it is
important to note here that this activist approach, though
criticized, is now well established in the American civil justice
system. Part III assesses the CJRA's contribution to the solidification of case management as an essential part of the
federal judicial function.
Ill. THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990 AND THE
FURTHERANCE OF PROCEDURAL ACTIVISM

The legislative history of the Civil Justice Reform Act makes
clear Qongress's intent to bring systemic, procedural reform to
the nation's civil justice system. 142 At the heart of this objective
is the belief that the reforms that preceded the Act-from
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to the use
of ad hoc management techniques-were not comprehensive
enough to effect sufficient change throughout the entire system. Indeed, the Act was based on the proposition that funda139. See, e.g., id. at 378. But see Peckham, supra note 89, at 263 ("Unreported or
ex parte communications do indeed provide a temptation for abuse and, more importantly, may create the appearance or suspicion of coerciveness. To alleviate this
potential abuse, ... all.status and pretrial conferences should be on the record with
all counsel present.").
140. But see Bilello v. Abbott Lab., 825 F. Supp. 475, 481 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). In
Bilello, the defense counsel argued that Judge Weinstein had a biased view of the
case stemming from his communications with the litigants during settlement
negotiations in a prior state action. Id. at 4 77. Judge Weinstein summarily dismissed
this argument, holding: "Without the participation of the judge in the settlement
process, civil litigants would be adversely affected. Federal and state judges have an
obligation to cooperate in clearing the dockets of both courts." Id. at 481.
141. See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 20, at 380.
142. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 416, supra note 7, at 2, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 6804 (explaining how expense and delay reduction plans will create a "national
framework for attacking the cost and delay problem, while implementing that strategy
through a policy of decentralization").
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mental alterations in the administration of civil justice remained necessary in spite of the increased use of managerial
techniques by judges, given the continuing escalation of cost
and delay involved in federal litigation. 143
According to the Act, systemic solutions to the national problems of cost and delay are sought, not through rigid, national
mandates, but through individual and unique plans written by
each district court. 144 Moreover, most district courts are not required to adopt specific procedures; rather, they are only
obligated to consider a number of procedures set forth in the
statute. 145 As discussed more fully below, the purpose of this
arrangement is to allow each district court to adopt and experiment with a set of procedures that works well under the court's
particular conditions. 146
Initially, at least, there is no uniformity among the ninetyfour federal judicial districts. One irony of the Act, therefore,
is that it seeks to bring about systemic, national change
through nonuniform, local experimentation with a host of
pretrial techniques. 147 The one consistent mandate of the Act,
however, is that each district court seek a more efficient
system through the judges' increased use of case management
techniques. As the Biden task force stated: "Both lawyers and
143. Such was the conclusion of a special task force convened at the behest of
Senator Biden to develop a set of recommendations to alleviate the problems of
excessive litigation cost and delay:
To a significant degree ... the reform efforts of years past have been stopgaps
designed to address narrow problems rather than to effect fundamental changes
that would dramatically improve the system. The rising costs and delays
involved in litigation demand now a more far-reaching approach ....
Although well intentioned, past changes in the [federal] rules failed to
alleviate the dual problems oflitigation costs and delays. Accordingly, we have
concluded that reform efforts must look beyond "tinkering changes," . . . and
must instead search for more systemic solutions.
TASK FoRCE ON ClvIL JUSTICE REFoRM, BRooKINGS INST., JUSTICE FoR ALL: REDUCING Cogrs
AND DELAY IN ClvIL LITIGATION 8-9 (1989Xcitation omitted) [hereinafter JUSTICE FOR ALL],
reprinted in The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 and the Judicial Improvements Act
of 1990: Hearings on S. 2027 and S. 2648 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 421 app. at 434-35 (1990) [hereinafter Senate Hearings].
144. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-472 (Supp. V 1993).
145. 28 U.S.C. § 473 (Supp. V 1993).
146. See infra Part IIl.A2.
147. See 28 U.S.C. § 473. But see Biden, supra note 137, at 1294 (noting that after
the courts' period of experimentation ends in 1997, the CJRA requires the Judicial
Conference to recommend either that all courts adopt the six principles of litigation
management set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 473(a) or that all adopt an alternative set of
guidelines specified by the Judicial Conference).
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judges overwhelmingly favor increasing the role of federal
judges as active case managers ...."148

A. Background
On January 25, 1990, Senator Joseph Biden introduced
Senate Bill 2027, known as the Civil Justice Reform Act of
1990. 149 The bill sought to reduce the costs and delay associated
with federal civil litigation by mandating that every federal
district court develop and implement an "expense and delay
reduction plan. "150 These plans were to incorporate certain
broad principles of litigation management delineated in the
bill. The central feature of the bill, as well as of the Act that
followed, was Congress's recognition that the desired reductions in cost and delay could only be achieved through the
active management by federal judges of the cases assigned to
them. 151

148. JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 143, at 7, reprinted in Senate Hearings at 433.
149. See S. REP. No. 416,supranote 7, at3, reprinted in 1990U.S.C.C.A.N at6805.
150. Id. at 2, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.AN. at 6804. The Senate Report stated:
Title I, the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, requires that every Federal district
court develop and implement a civil justice expense and delay reduction plan.
Each plan, which will be based on the recommep.dations and assessment of a
local advisory group convened in each district, will apply certain well-accepted
principles and guidelines of litigation management. In this way, title I promulgates a national strategy and national framework for attacking the cost and
delay problem, while implementing that strategy through a policy of decentralization.
Id.
151. Senator Biden explained that "[e]ach of the principles set forth in the Act
rests on a common premise: intelligent case management puts limited judicial
resources to their best use and reduces delay and excessive cost in civil litigation.•
Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Equal, Accessible, Affordable Justice Under Law: The Civil
Justice Reform.Act of 1990, 1 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL 'y 1, 5-6 (1992). The President's
Council on Competitiveness reached the same conclusion in its report on civil justice
reform. See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 112, at 20.
These conclusions were incorporated into a presidential executive order. Exec.
Order No. 12, 778, 3 C.F.R. § 359 (1991), reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519 (Supp. V 1993).
This order requires all federal agencies involved in civil litigation to adopt a number
of reform techniques, including prefiling the notice of a complaint to the disputants
in an effort to achieve settlement, producing core information prior to formal
discovery, and using alternative dispute resolution resources where appropriate. Id.
For a more extensive discussion of this executive order, see Richey, supra note 91, at
534-35.
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1. The Louis Harris Study on Procedural Reform of the
Civil Justice System and the Brookings Report-The bill's
emphasis on the need for active judicial management was
based on two studies that examined the state of civil justice in
America. The first was a survey conducted by Louis Harris and
Associates (the Harris Survey). 152 This study involved extensive
telephone interviews with over 1000 attorneys and judges
involved in the federal justice system. 153 The majority of the
survey participants identified discovery abuse as a "major
cause" of undue cost and delay in federal litigation. 154 Such
abuses included the tendency by some to over-discover and the
related strategy of using discovery as an adversarial tool to
impose additional financial burdens on one's opponent. 155 A
significant majority of the interviewees agreed that to achieve
reform of the civil justice system, the role of the judge as an
active case manager would have to be increased. 156
152. LoUIS HARRIS & Assoc., PROCEDURAL REFORM OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM
(1989), reprinted in The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 and the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990: Hearings on S. 2027 and S. 2648 Before the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 91-184 (1990) [hereinafter HARRIS SURVEY).
153. Id. at 92. The survey involved interviews with 250 private plaintiffs' lawyers,
250 private defense lawyers, 100 public interest lawyers, 300 corporate general
counsel of companies selected from the 5000 largest corporations in America, and 14 7
federal ·district court judges. Id.
154. Sixty-two percent of plaintiff and defense counsel, 63% of the public interest
lawyers, 80% of the corporate counsel, and 71 % of the judges expressed this opinion.
Id. at 128.
The identification of discovery abuse as a chief cause of undue cost and delay in
federal litigation was no.t a novel conclusion. In 1980, Justice Powell, in dissenting
from the adoption of certain amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
recognized the devastating effects that discovery abuse was levying upon the system:
[A)ll too often, discovery practices enable the party with greater financial
resources to prevail by exhausting the resources of a weaker opponent. The mere
threat of delay or unbearable expense denies justice to many actual or prospective litigants. Persons or businesses of comparatively limited means settle unjust
claims and relinquish just claims simply because they cannot afford to litigate.
Litigation costs have become intolerable, and they cast a lengthening shadow
over the basic fairness of our legal system.
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 F.R.D. 521, 523 (1980)
(Powell, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
155. HARRIS SURVEY, supra note 152, at 132.
156. Id. at 161. This reform proposal was favored by 83% of the plaintiff lawyers,
80% of the defense lawyers, 89% of the public interest lawyers, 92% of the corporate
counsel, and 84% of the federal trial judges. Id. For a critique of the methodology of
the Harris Survey, see Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth
of Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46
STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1410-15 (1994). In particular, Professor Mullenix takes issue with
the Harris Survey's declaration of procedural deficiencies in the federal system based
on nothing more than answers to an opinion poll. Id. at 1413.
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The Brookings Institute and the Foundation for Change
formed a task force to conduct the second study (Brookings Report).157 This task force had been assembled at Senator Biden's
request to recommend ways the civil justice system could be
reformed. 158 The members of this group met six times between
September 1988 and June 1989 to formulate a report. 159 The
final report, entitled Justice for All: Reducing Costs and Delay
in Civil Litigation, provided the basis for the Civil Justice
Reform bill 160 that Senator Biden introduced on January 25,
1990. 161
The thesis of the report reiterated the findings of the Harris
Survey that those involved with the civil justice system in
America are widely dissatisfied with the high cost and slow
pace of federal litigation:
The American system of civil justice is tinder attack: from
clients who believe that their cases take too long to get to
trial and cost far too much; from federal and state legislators who hear these complaints from their constituents;
from judges who must manage the system; and from many
attorneys themselves who participate in it. 162
The report offered solutions in the form of twelve broad procedural recommendations, 163 four recommendations for expanding

157. JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 143, at vii, reprinted in Senate Hearings at 423.
The Harris Survey was conducted in connection with the activities of the task force
and its results were incorporated into the task force's report. Id. at 6. Professor
Mullenix, however, questions the report's validity because "[t]he analysis and
recommendation set out in the ... report were supported solely by the Harris survey;
the report acknowledged no studies or evidence contrary to the task force conclusions. n
Mullenix, supra note 156, at 1417.
158. JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 143, at vii, reprinted in Senate Hearings at 423.
The task force included "leading litigators from the plaintiffs' and defense bar, civil
and women's rights lawyers, attorneys representing consumer and environmental
organizations, representatives of the insurance industry, general counsels of major
corporations, former judges and law professors." Id.
159. Id.
160. S. 2027, lOlst Cong., 2d Seas. (1990).
161. S. REP. No. 416, supra note 7, at 13, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6816.
162. JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 143, at vii, reprinted in Senate Hearings at 423.
163. Id. at 12-29, reprinted in Senate Hearings at 438-55. These recommendations
consist largely of management techniques that are set forth in the CJRA. Compare
id. at 12, reprinted in Senate Hearings at 438 (recommending that courts be statutorily directed to develop and implement a "Civil Justice Reform Plann) with 28 U.S.C.
§ 471(Supp.V1993) (requiring that United States district courts implement a "civil
justice expense and delay reduction plan"); compare JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 143,
at 14, reprinted in Senate Hearings at 440 (recommending that each district court
include in its Civil Justice Reform Plan a system of case tracking or differentiated case
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judicial resources, 164 and a series ofrecommendations for attorneys and their clients. 166 Like the Harris Survey that preceded
it, the Brookings Report based many of its recommendations
on the need for district judges to become more active in the
litigation process: "[I]t is essential that the courts intervene at
the earliest possible stage to structure the litigation with a
view toward minimizing costs and delays. "166
2. The "Cornerstone" Principles of Civil Justice ReformAccording to the legislative history of the Act, the bill introduced by Senator Biden rested on six "cornerstone" principles
of civil justice reform, five of which directly assumed increased
judicial case management. 167 These principles called for:
(1) building reform from the "bottom up"; (2) promulgating
a national, statutory policy in support of judicial case
management; (3) imposing greater controls on the discovery process; (4) establishing differentiated case management systems; (5) improving motions practice and reducing
undue delays associated. with decisions on motions; and
(6) expanding and enhancing the use of alternative dispute
resolution. 168
In adopting these principles, Congress articulated a number
of policy determinations. Most notably, Congress echoed the
conclusions of both the Harris Survey and the Brookings Report that reform of the present system depended on the active
case administration of district court judges: "As the number of
cases has increased and the cases themselves have become
increasingly complex, judges, court administrators, and other
civil justice system experts have recognized the importance of
courts exercising early, active, and continuous control over
case progress. "169 .

management) with 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(l) (Supp. V 1993) (requiring that each district
court consider including in its plan a "systematic, differential treatment of civil cases
that tailors the level of individualized and case specific management").
164. JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 143, at 30-33, reprinted in Senate Hearings at
456-59.
165. Id. at 34-39, reprinted in Senate Hearings at 460-65.
166. Id. at "24, reprinted in Senate Hearings at 450. The Brookings Report continues: "We believe the best mechanism for accomplishing this objective is to require
each district court's [expense and delay reduction) plan to provide for a mandatory
scheduling conference-presided over by judges and not magistrates-at the outset
of all but the simplest and. most routine of cases ...." Id.
167. S. REP. No. 416, supra note 7, at 14, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6817.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 16, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6819.
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Congress determined, however, that such managerial control by the judiciary should not be mandated generally, but
rather should be tailored to address the specific circumstances of each of the ninety-four district courts in the federal
system. 170 Accordingly, while Congress hoped eventually to
see uniformity in the implementation of the Act's mandates,
it initially incorporated the recommendation of the Brookings
task force that every district court should be required to implement its own expense and delay reduction plan after considering the recommendations of a local advisory group. 171
This approach, characterized as implementing reform from
the "bottom up," had the dual benefits of drawing on the
experience of those who actually practiced before the court in
question and of "stimulat[ing] a much-needed dialogue between the bench, the bar, and client communities about
methods for streamlining litigation practice." 172
As one of the central aspects of litigation reform, Congress
attempted to streamline discovery. Emphasizing the conclusions of the Harris Survey and the Brookings Report, Congress
identified discovery abuse as a chief cause of needless cost and
.delay in the federal courts. 173 Congress listed discovery control
by the judiciary as a necessary goal of civil justice reform in
its cornerstone principles. 174 These principles, in turn, became
a national directive on December 1, 1990, when President
Bush signed the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990. 175

170. See id. at 2, 14-16, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6804, 6817-19.
171. See id. at 14, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6817.
172. JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 143, at 12, reprinted in Senate Hearings at 438.
173. S. REP. No. 416, supra note 7, at 20, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6823.
("Discovery abuse is a principal cause of high litigation transaction costs. Indeed, in
far too many cases, economics-and not the merits-govern discovery decisions."); see
also id. at 22, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6825 ("The day is fast approaching-if
it is not already here-when litigators will not try cases; they will just discover each
other to death.") (quoting Discovery, LITIG., Fall 1988, at 7).
174. See supra notes 167--68 and accompanying text.
175. The bill, as signed into law on December 1, 1990, differed in some material
respects from the bill as introduced by Senator Biden on January 25, 1990, although
these differences are not relevant for purposes of this Article. For discussions of the
bill's legislative evolution, see Mullenix, supra note 18, at 407-24. For a discussion
on the merit of a legislative solution of litigation management abuse and delays over
a judicially imposed solution, see Jeffrey J. Peck, "Users United": The Civil Justice
Reform Act of 1990, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PRODS., Summer 1991, at 105, 109-17.
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B. Implementation of the Civil Justice Reform Act
1. Provisions-The Act begins by setting forth a number
of "findings," which are closer to statements on policy than
they are to factual assertions. 176 However amorphous, these
findings share a common premise and, not surprisingly, they
come to the same conclusion advanced by the Harris Survey,
the Brookings Report, and Senator Biden's task force: For civil
justice reform to occur, district court judges must employ "effective litigation management" techniques in the administration of their dockets. 177
The Act requires that each district court develop and implement a "civil justice expense and delay reduction plan." 178 As
stated by the Act, "[t]he purposes of each plan are to facilitate
deliberate adjudication of civil cases on the merits, monitor
discovery, improve litigation management, and ensure just,
speedy, and inexpensive resolutions of civil disputes." 179 Each
court is instructed to develop a plan after receiving the recommendations of an advisory group. 180 The advisory groups are
required to submit a report to their respective courts after
examining a number of the court's features, including the
condition of the criminal and civil dockets, the trends in case
filings, the principal causes of cost and delay in civil litigation,
and the ways in which cost and delay can be reduced. 181 Both
the advisory group report and the subsequent district court
plan are then reviewed by the chief judges of each district
court in the circuit and the chief judge of the court of appeals
for that circuit, as well as by the Judicial Conference of the
United States. 182
The "principles and guidelines oflitigation management and
cost and delay reduction" set forth in the Act 183 focus primarily
on increased judicial involvement in the administration of

176. See, e.g., Civil Justice Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 102(3), 104 Stat.
5089 (1990) ("The solutions to problems of cost and delay must include significant
contributions by the courts, the litigants, the litigants' attorneys, and by the
Congress and the executive branch.").
177. § 102(5), 104 Stat. at 5089.
178. 28 U.S.C. § 471(Supp.V1993).
179. Id.
180. 28 u.s.c. § 478.
181. 28 u.s.c. § 472.
182. 28 u.s.c. §§ 472(d), 474(b).
183. 28 U.S.C. § 473(a).

340

University of Michigan Journal. of Law 'Reform . [VOL. 28:2

pretrial procedure~ from tracking cases according to their complexity, to "early and ongoing control of the pretrial process,"
to encouraging cost-effective discovery, and to the referral of
appropriate cases to alternative dispute resolution programs. 184
Perhaps the most comprehensive of these case management
principles is section 473(a)(3), which combines case development, discovery control, and settlement consideration in the
context of complex or "other appropriate" cases. 185
2. Operation-The Act does not require the use of any
procedure listed in section 473(a)(l}-(6) for eighty-four of the
ninety-four federal district courts. Rather, each district court
(except for a designated group of ten), 186 in consultation with
its appointed advisory group, need only consider whether to
incorporate these principles into its expense and delay reduction plan. 187 This discretionary approach does not apply,

184. § 4 73(a)(l)-(6); see also Linda S. Mullenix, Civil Justice Reform Comes to the
Southern District of Texas: Creating and Implementing a Cost and Reduction Plan
Under the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 11 REV. LITIG. 165, 169 (1992) ("[T]he
almost exclusive emphasis of the Act is on tighter managerial control over pretrial
proceedings, curbing discovery abuse, and recourse to alternative dispute resolution.").
185. § 4 73(a)(3). This section provides as a "principle[] and guideline":
(3) for all cases that the court or an individual judicial officer determines are
complex and any other appropriate cases, careful and deliberate monitoring
through a discovery-case management conference or a series of such conferences
at which the presiding judicial ofticer(A) explores the parties' receptivity to, and the propriety of, settlement or
proceeding with the litigation;
(B) identifies or formulates the principal issues in contention and, in appropriate cases, provides for the staged resolution or bifurcation of issues
for trial consistent with Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil procedure;
(C) prepares a discovery schedule and plan consistent with any presumptive
time limits that a district court may set for the completion of discovery
and with any procedures a district court may develop to(i)
identify and limit the volume of discovery available to avoid
unnecessary or unduly burdensome or expensive discovery; and
(ii) phase discovery into two or more stages; and
(D) sets, at the earliest practicable time, deadlines for filing motions and
a time framework for their disposition.

Id.
186. See infra text accompanying notes 188-89.
187. See 28 U.S.C. § 473(a). Under§ 473(b), each advisory group and district court
must consider a number of procedural techniques, including requirements that (1) the
parties submit a joint discovery plan, (2) all requests for extensions of deadlines for
completion of discovery be signed by the attorney and client; and (3) a representative
of the parties with authority to bind them be made available by telephone during
settlement conferences. 28 U.S.C. § 473(b).
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however, to those ten courts chosen as "Pilot Districts. "188 The
Act instructed the Judicial Conference to select by December
31, 1991, ten district courts to participate in a pilot program
in which the case management principles specified in the Act
had to be included in each court's expense and delay reduction
plan.1s9
Each pilot district had to complete its cost and delay reduction plan by December 31, 1991. 190 The pilot districts' plans
must remain in effect for a minimum of three years. 191 At the
end of this three-year period, "an independent organization
with expertise in the area of Federal court management" will
compare the cost and delay reduction in pilot districts with
that of similar districts for which adoption of the Act's management principles was discretionary. 192 The Judicial Conference shall include this study in a report it must submit by
December 31, 1996 to the Committees on the Judiciary for the
House of Representatives and for the Senate. 193 In this report,
the Judicial Conference must recommend either the expansion
of the number of districts for which the Act's management
guidelines are mandatory, or the implementation of alternative cost reduction programs. 194

188. Civil Justice Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 105, 104 Stat. 5089, 5097-98
(1990), reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 471 app. (Supp. V 1993).
189. § 105(b), 104 Stat. at 5097. -t\t least five of the pilot districts had to encompass metropolitan areas. Id. The Judicial Conference selected the following courts as
pilot districts: Southern District of California, District of Delaware, Northern District
of Georgia, Western District of Tennessee, Southern District of New York, Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, Western District of Oklahoma, Southern District of Texas,
District of Utah, and Eastern District of Wisconsin. CJRA REPORT, supra note 6, at
1-2.
190. § 105(b), 104 Stat. at 5097. Reports on the cost and delay reduction plans
were due by December 31, 1993. § 105(c), 104 Stat. at 5098.
191. § 105(b)(3), 104 Stat. at 5097.
192. § 105(c), 104 Stat. at 5098. In May 1992, the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts contracted with the RAND Corporation to conduct this study.
See CJRA REPORT, supra note 6, at 25.
193. CJRA REPORT, supra note 6, at 25. The Act originally required the Judicial
Conference to submit its report on December 31, 1995, but this deadline was
extended by one year to allow for a more comprehensive report. Id.
194. § 105(c)(2), 104 Stat. at 5098. Also on December 31, 1995, the Judicial
Conference must report on the Act's "Demonstration Program."§ 104(d), 104 Stat. at
5097. This program designates five district courts to experiment with various case
management techniques. The Western District of Michigan and the Northern District
of Ohio are required to "experiment with systems of differentiated case management,"
and the Northern District of California, the Northern District of West Virginia, and
the Western District of Missouri are required to "experiment with various methods
of reducing cost and delay in civil litigation, including alternative dispute resolution."
§ 104(a), (b), 104 Stat. at 5097.
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This reporting requirement is part of the Act's long-term
goal of bringing greater uniformity to the various case management principles that the district courts formulate in their
plans. The recommendations of the Judicial Conference's
report-whether to adopt across-the-board adoption of the
Act's principles or to impose these or other procedures on some
or all district courts-will ultimately form the basis of a wider·
plan regarding the reduction of cost and delay in the federal
courts. 195 According to Senator Biden, this broader program
will be implemented whether or not the principles delineated
in the Act prove effective: "Regardless of the Judicial Conference's determination, proceedings will be initiated under the
Rules Enabling Act to make permanent a national plan for
assuring the speedy and inexpensive resolution of civil disputes."196 The eventual standardization of these procedures
will eliminate, at least in theory, the inefficiencies stemming
from the present requirement that litigants familiarize themselves with different CJRA procedures in each of the ninetyfour federal district courts.
3. The Judge as Case Manager-As of December 1, 1993,
all ninety-four of the district courts had implemented their
expense and delay reduction plans. 197 Of these ninety-four
plans, eighty-six explicitly require "Early Involvement of [a]
Judicial Officer." 198 The most prominent devices for the assertion of this judicial control are the setting of an early and firm
trial date, 199 the holding of a case management conference, and

195. § 105(c)(2)(C), 104 Stat. at 5098.
196. Biden, supra note 151, at 16.
197. CJRA REPORT, supra note 6, at 2.
198. See id. app. I (showing which of the six principles of cost and delay reduction
embodied in the Act have been adopted by each district court). The CJRA Report
indicates that 96% of the courts have adopted the principle of controlling the extent
and time for completion of discovery, 91 % adopted the principle of early and ongoing
judicial control of pretrial proceedings, and 87% instituted the principle of requiring
the voluntary exchange of information as part of the discovery process. Id. at 4.
199. Several plans require that a firm trial date be set at the case management
conference. Many jurisdictions establish an 18-month limit from the filing of the
complaint until the date of trial. See, e.g., U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF
IDAHO, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN (Mar. 1, 1992) (setting a
goal that 95% of cases should be tried within 18 month period); U.S. DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA, CIVJL JUSTICE ExPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION
PLAN (Dec. 31, 1991) (suggesting that judge should set trial date within 18
months); U.S. DISTRICT CoURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLoRIDA, CIVJL JUSTICE
EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN (Nov. 1991) (requiring trial no more than 18
months after tiling of complaint); U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF
CALIFORNIA, CIVIL JUSTICE ExPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN (Oct. 18, 1991) (setting
trial date within 12 to 18 months of complaint, depending on the type of case).
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the establishment of a case management plan. Most important
is the case management conference, at which such issues as
case tracking, discovery schedules, motion practice, and a trial
date are discussed. 200
In the District of Massachusetts, for example, unless ordered
otherwise, the parties are required to file a joint statement no
later than five business days prior to the management conference. The statement must include (1) a joint discovery plan
scheduling the time and length of all discovery events, (2) a
schedule for the filing of motions, and (3) certifications signed
by each party and its counsel that the party and counsel have
conferred about establishing a budget for the progress of the
litigation through trial. 201 Irrespective of whether the various
district plans require the parties to submit a written report
before the management conference, most of the plans instruct
the court, after the conference, to set the pace of the litigation
through the issuance of a management order addressing such
matters as discovery limits, motion deadlines, the time and
methods for the identification of experts, and the date of the
next, or final, pretrial conference. 202
The discovery parameters set forth in such management
orders are often dictated by the track to which the court
assigns the particular case. 203 The "tracking" of cases results
from the Act's identification of differential case management

Other plans require that a firm trial date be set at the earliest possible point in
the litigation. See, e.g.' U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE, CIVIL
JUSTICE ExPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN (Dec. 23, 1991); U.S. DI.STRICT CoURT FOR
THE EAsTERN AND WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY
REDUCTION PLAN (Dec. 30, 1991).
200. See, e.g., U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI, CIVIL
JUSTICE ExPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN (Nov. 30, 1993); U.S. DI.STRICT CoURT FOR
THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN
(Nov. 18, 1991); U.S. DISTRICT CoURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, CIVIL
JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN (Oct. 18, 1991).
201. US. Dlm'RICT CoURT FOR THE DlmUCT OF MAssAcHusBTrs, Civn. JUSTICE ExPENSE
AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN, Rule 1.02(d) (Nov. 18, 1991),
202. See, e.g., U.S. DISTRICTCoURTFORTHE SOUTHERNDISTRICTOFNEWYORK, CIVIL
JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN (Dec. 12, 1991) ("The Court should adopt
guidelines for deposition practice, interrogatories, requests for documents and
discovery of experts.").
203. See, e.g., US. DI.STRICT CoURT FOR THE MIDDLE DI.STRICT OF PEN"NSYLVANIA, CIVIL
JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAy REDUCTION PLAN (Aug. 19, 1993) (dividing the caseload into
"fast track," "expedited track," "standard track," and "complex track" litigation); see
also CJRA REPORT, supra note 6, at 11 ("[Thirty-two] district court plane establish
limits, or suggest that judicial officers place limits, on interrogatories, depositions,
or both. Typically, these limits ... vary by track and length of discovery; more
complex cases are given more time for discovery, and litigants are allowed a greater
number of interrogatories and depositions.").
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as a principle of cost and delay reduction. 204 Through categorizing the cases on its docket, the court becomes involved in
the litigation at an early stage. 205 Thus, for example, under the
Eastern District of Texas's plan, the judge must place a case
on one of six tracks, ranging from least complex to most complex, shortly after the case is filed. 206 The first four tracks
contain specific limitations on the kinds and amount of discovery that can be taken. 207 These limitations are not permissive;
the parties cannot agree to alter these restrictions. 208 Rather,
they must seek modification at the management conference
with the judge. 209 Tracks five and six, however, do not have
specific discovery limits because the cases assigned to them
are too complex to be subjected to predetermined schedules. 210
For these types of cases, the judge must take an even more
active role in shaping discovery, and the judge is instructed by
the plan to tailor a discovery schedule that fits the particular
management needs of the case. 211
The active and central role of the judge in the management
of the litigation is certainly the common theme in all of the
district plans. This feature manifests itself in many ways. In
the District of South Carolina, for example, the court itself
sends interrogatories to the parties to gather information on
the law and facts of the case, the witnesses involved, and the
discovery anticipated by the parties. 212 In the Northern District of Indiana, the judge can order the parties to participate
in a settlement conference when the judge deems such a conference appropriate. 213 In the Eastern District of Virginia, the
court makes explicit in its plan what is otherwise an implicit

204. See 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(l) (Supp. V 1993).
205. See CJRA REPORT, supra note 6, at 8 ("[Differential case management] brings
together two trends in case management into one cohesive system: 1) the monitoring
of case events; and 2) the supervision of time periods between case events through
case processing 'tracks,' keyed to serve broad case types.").
206. US. DISTRlCT CoURT FOR THE EAs'I'ERN DISTRICT OF TExAs, CIVIL JUSTICE ExPENsE
AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN, Art. I (Dec. 31, 1991).
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. US. DlBm.ICT CoURI' FOR THE DlBm.ICT OF SOUIH CAlloLINA, CIVIL JUSTICE ExPENsE
AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN (Nov. 29, 1993).
213. U.S. DISTRICT CoURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA, CIVIL JUSTICE
EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN (Dec. 31, 1991).
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tenet of the entire CJRA-that the court is to control the
litigation, not the lawyers:
[T]he hallmark of this particular court is that its judges
control and manage the litigation process. From the preliminary involvement in setting a discovery schedule ...
to the absolute control over deadlines and the trial date[,]
the court makes it clear to attorneys and litigants alike
that the court, and not the lawyers control the docket. 214
By allowing the judicial officer to control the litigation process, rather than simply the trial itself, the Act incorporates
values more typically associated with the civil law procedural
tradition, as opposed to the common law tradition. 215 In the
face of this early and ongoing judicial supervision of the litigation, the delineation between trial, traditionally controlled
by the judge, and pretrial, historically controlled by the parties,
begins to break down. Professor Judith Resnik has argued that
this early and active involvement in the litigation can affect
the judge's impartiality: "[A]s pretrial case managers, judges
operate in the freewheeling arena of informal dispute resolution. Having supervised case preparation and pressed for
settlement, judges can hardly be considered untainted if they
are ultimately asked to find the facts and adjudicate the merits
of a dispute." 216
Unlike the civil law tradition, the judicial officer in charge
of pretrial matters in the federal courts is also the officer
before whom the trial takes place. 217 A central assumption
of the Act, therefore, is that judges must be trusted to
remain impartial, despite their more active role in the processing of the litigation. 218 The question remains whether
the Act-with its emphasis on case management and de214. us. Dlsnucr OoURI' FOR 1HE EAsn:RN Dlsnucr OF VIRGINIA, CML JusnCE ExPENsE
AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN (Dec. 31, 1991).
215. See supra notes 65-75 and accompanying text.
216. Resnik, supra note 20, at 429-30 (footnotes omitted).
217. In the civil law procedural tradition, however, the judicial officer who handles

the pretrial discovery stages of the case does not preside over the dispute at trial. See
MERRYMAN, supra note 65, at 11-12; Jolowicz, supra note 73, at 247.
218. Chief Judge Robert F. Peckham stated, in response to Professor Resnick's

concerns: "Impartiality is a capacity of mind-a learned ability to recognize and
compartmentalize the reievant from the irrelevant and to detach one's emotional from
one's rational faculties. Only because we trust judges to be able to satisfy these
obligations do we permit them to exercise such power and oversight. n Peckham, supra
note 89, at 262.

346

University of Michigan Journal of Law lleform

[VOL. 28:2

emphasis of litigant autonomy-will effectuate a better
system of justice than the one it seeks to reform.

C. The Civil Justice Reform Act and the
Lockean Tradition
There are numerous criteria by which a legislative act may
be evaluated. Its success may be determined, for example,
based on whether the act achieved its goals, whether it did so
in a cost-effective manner, and whether the act sacrificed any
important values in achieving those goals. As this Article has
shown, the CJRA represents a further stage in a significant
movement away from the values that formed the historical and
philosophical basis of Anglo-American law. Whether the Act
ultimately achieves its goals remains to be seen. However, the
changes necessary to achieve the Act's goals, attainable or not,
are already emerging.
At this early stage of the Act's implementation, the single
most discernible consequence of the Act is the transformation
of the judge's pretrial role, from that of an overseer to that of
a case manager. The judge has become the animating force in
the civil litigation process. This transformation of the judge's
role was deemed necessary by Congress in light of the growing
demands placed on the system. 219 As Chief Justice Rehnquist
observed:
[T]ime and again the nation has looked to the federal
courts to handle a larger and larger proportion of society's
problems. One can certainly doubt the wisdom of this trend,
and particularly of some of its specific examples, but that
is not the point. The point is that as a result of people

219. Cf. Wil..LIAM W. SCHwARZER & ALAN HmscH, THE El.EMENm OF CAsE MANAGEMENT
1 (1991). Schwarzer and Hirsch posit:
Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure describes the goal of the judicial
system: 'to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action.' If judges are to achieve this goal in the face of scarce judicial resources
and the rising cost of litigation, they must manage the litigation process.

Id.
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looking to the federal courts those courts have become overburdened and the system has become clogged. 220
The CJRA was a congressional attempt to reform the civil
justice system, not by enlarging it or by reducing the work that
it had to do, but by making it more efficient. This efficiency is
achieved through a transformation of the federal judge: what
once was a passive, reactive umpire must now become an
assertive, proactive manager. In the eyes of Congress, this
transformation represented the best chance of keeping the
federal courts accessible to all who sought their use.
The success of the CJRA must ultimately be judged, however, not merely on whether it increases the efficiency of the
federal adjudicative process, but also on whether by doing so
it increases the net freedom, autonomy, and liberty of individual litigants. One way to make this determination is to
ascertain whether individuals would agree to the costs that
the Act exacts in order to reap the anticipated benefits to the
adjudicatory system. The CJRA, much like the move away
from the state of nature in Locke's philosophy, 221 represents a
significant philosophical compromise undertaken to achieve an
otherwise seemingly elusive goal. For Locke, it was a wholly
rational, though difficult, decision for humanity to leave the
state of nature, for while the prospect of unlimited freedom
existed in the state of nature, logistical difficulties resulted in
a tremendous diminution of these freedoms. 222 By forfeiting
some theoretical liberty and autonomy in order to enter civil
society, individuals were able to capture a larger share of
actual autonomy than was possible in the state of nature; that
is, while the absolute freedoms available to individuals diminished in civil society, there was a net gain of freedoms actually
enjoyed. 223
Although Congress perhaps never so intended, the CJRA
marks a similar transition. By increasingly empowering the
judge at the expense of the litigants, the Act represents a clear
diminution in the absolute autonomy of individuals who invoke the civil justice system, an autonomy that we as a society
have long cherished. Underlying this transformation, however,
is the notion that because of the expense and delay claimed to
220.
221.
222.
223.

Rehnquist, supra note 10, at 3.
See supra Part I.B.2.
See supra notes 34-44 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 42-44 and acc~mpanying text.
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beset the federal adjudicatory system, individuals have not
been able to capture the sort of gains in autonomy and liberty
that the system was designed to safeguard. The Act presupposes that, much like the decision to leave the state of nature,
it is rational for a litigant to forfeit, up-front, some individual
autonomy to reap a net gain in substantive liberty, namely
access to a more meaningful federal civil adjudicative process.
The direct costs of the CJRA, in addition to the philosophical
compromises, are real. For example, the Act adds a level of
complexity to the practice offederal civil litigation by requiring
each district court to implement its own cost and delay reduction plan. The lack of uniformity among the districts' plans
places an additional burden upon the litigant or, more accurately, its counsel, who must learn the district's local rules, the
applicable standing orders of the assigned judge, and also the
particularities of the local expense and delay reduction plan. 224
For the CJRA to be justifiable, individuals would have had to
agree to these costs in the hope of reaping greater benefit from
the adjudicatory system. Whether this would occur is dependent
upon, among other factors, how successful the Act proves to be
in bringing about meaningful gains in the process of federal
civil adjudication.
It is premature, at this stage, to evaluate the success of the
Act. How effectively it brings about a net gain of fundamental freedoms remains to be seen. Nevertheless, the Act represents a bold move by Congress-surely far bolder than it
realized-away from certain, primary concepts of the role of
the judge in the Anglo-American system of justice. The Civil

224.. One commentator argues that the requirements imposed on litigants and
courts by the Act reduces the quality of justice that the courts are able to provide. See
Tobias, supra note 93, at 1426-27. Tobias notes:
Growing balkanization adversely affects the civil justice system. For example,
the earlier procedural developments, such as managerial judging, as elaborated
by the CJRA's implementation, require that attorneys and parties prepare, file,
and sign a greater number of papers and attend more conferences, multiply the
steps in lawsuits, and enhance the emphasis on ADR. Most importantly, these
considerations make it more difficult to ascertain the truth and to reach the
merits of disputes, diminishing the quality of justice secured.

Id. at 1426.
Not surprisingly, the Judicial Conference's December 1994 report suggests that the
Act is achieving more favorable results. See CJRA REPORT, supra note 6, at 27 ("Although empirical findings are not yet available, anecdotal reports, as well as a number
of the advisory group reports and court plans, indicate that the Act has had a
beneficial impact on the federal courts.").
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Justice Reform Act stands as more than just an alteration to
the mechanism of adjudication in the United States. It is a
statement by Congress that it is necessary to deviate from
certain time-honored values in order for civil litigants to have
more meaningful access to the federal adjudicatory system in
the future.
CONCLUSION

The Civil Justice Reform Act has pushed the state's role in
the administration of civil justice in this country increasingly
toward an activist position. This has resulted in the further
distancing of our judicial process from the Lockean and
Blackstonian conception that individual rights and individual
autonomy lead to, and are a justification for, the formation of
the state, and has suggested a move toward the opposite view
that the state empowers individuals with these rights. Such a
move, while deemed necessary by both the legislature and
the judiciary, further attenuates our system of government
from that envisioned by the Founders during our nation's
formative era. Whether such a step is necessary in order to
achieve a more efficient, responsive, and effective judiciary
should become clearer in the years to come.

